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Lifeness signatures and the roots of the tree of life
Christophe Malaterre 
Abstract: Do  trees  of  life  have  roots?  What  do  these  roots  look  like?  In  this 
contribution, I argue that research on the origins of life might offer glimpses on the 
topology of these very roots. More specifically, I argue (1) that the roots of the tree of  
life go well below the level of the commonly mentioned ‘ancestral organisms’ down 
into the level of much simpler, minimally living entities that might be referred to as 
‘protoliving systems’, and (2) that further below, a system of roots gradually dissolves 
into non-living matter along several functional dimensions. In between non-living and 
living matter, one finds physico-chemical systems that I propose to characterize by a 
‘lifeness signature’. In turn, this ‘lifeness signature’ might also account for a diverse 
range of biochemical entities that are found to be ‘less-than-living’ yet ‘more-than-non-
living’. 
Key words: tree of life, origin of life, definition of life, protoliving systems, protocells, 
LUCA, lifeness signature
1. Introduction
At the very start of the 19th century, the French botanist Augustin Augier produced one 
of the earliest  known published tree of life showing relationships of organisms (see 
Fig.1, Augier 1801; see Stevens 1983). This tree-like diagram is replete with leaves and 
branches that represent members of the plant kingdom and their relationships with one 
another. Interestingly, this diagram also displays a system of roots that spread downward 
from the base of the trunk. Augier unfortunately did not give to these roots any role but 
graphical: they stand in the diagram without label and without explanatory force. And 
such  was  the  state  of  scientific  knowledge  at  that  time.  Major  subsequent 
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representations of the tree of life stick to explanatory relevant elements and do not have 
roots.  This  is  so of  Darwin’s  famous branching diagram included in  The Origin  of  
Species (1859),  of  Haeckel’s  realistic  tree-like  picture  featured  in  the  General 
Morphology (1866),  even  of  Doolittle’s  recent  representation  of  the  ‘bush’ of  life 
(1999). What can recent scientific research tell us about these very roots? How far down 
can  we  go?  In  this  contribution,  I  argue  that  origins  of  life  research  offers  some 
glimpses about these roots. More specifically, I formulate two major claims. The first 
one is that trees of life ought to go deeper than the level of the ‘ancestral organisms’ 
where they generally stop: this deeper level is the level of much simpler and minimally 
alive entities that might be referred to as ‘protoliving systems’1. My second claim is that 
below protoliving systems, the tree of life dissolves gradually into non-living matter 
along a multidimensional system roots. This second claim follows from a gradual and 
multidimensional definition of life according to which the transition from non-living to 
living matter is a gray-zone populated by physico-chemical systems characterized by 
particular ‘lifeness signatures’. 
2. The ‘ancestral organisms’ and the tree of life before them
When looking at a tree of life, one often sees small branches receding into larger ones, 
and large branches that in turn merge into even larger ones until one reaches the bottom 
of a trunk. Run backwards, the story of evolution would appear to converge onto some 
sort of common ancestor of all living forms. As Darwin put it, a logical outcome of 
descent with modification and natural selection is that “probably all the organic beings 
which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, 
into which  life was first breathed” (1859: 484). Most, if not all, trees of life illustrate 
this thought by displaying a trunk, or a system of trunks, that start at some ancestral 
state.  Of course,  molecular  biology has  given empirical  support to  such a  claim,  in 
particular by showing that specific biochemical themes, be they chemical constituents of 
the cells or metabolic pathways, appear to be common to all known terrestrial life forms 
(Pace 2001). 
This hypothetical ancestral state is often taken to be the point in time when the three 
domains of life,  Bacteria,  Eucarya and Archae (Woese and Fox 1977), were not yet 
distinct and were somehow still merged into a single domain, probably a couple billion 
years ago. What constitutes this single domain remains a matter of controversy.  For 
some, it is a unique organism or a cloned population of similar organisms; in this case, 
the ancestral state may be referred to as the “cenancestor” (Fitch and Upper 1987), or as 
1 The  term  “protoliving  system”  has  been  used  in  origins  of  life  studies  with  the  meaning  of 
rudimentary, primordial -and potentially minimal- living systems (Fox 1991) It is with this meaning that I  
use the term here. This meaning might be found to be synonymous to that of “protocell” even though  
protoliving systems do not require, strictly speaking, to be cell-like. Also, the term “protocell” is now 
often used in synthetic biology with a broader meaning, for instance including systems made out of non-
prebiotically compatible compounds or resulting from artificial life research (e.g. Rasmussen et al 2009) 
than the initial meaning it had in origins of life studies (e.g. Krampitz, Fox 1969; Stillwell 1980; de Duve 
1991).
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the “last universal common ancestor”, or in short, as “LUCA” (Forterre and Philippe 
1999). For others, this single domain would consist in a population of several types of 
organisms that, as a whole but not individually, would possess most of the basic features 
common to contemporary life forms; this population would also be subject to so much 
lateral  gene  transfer  that  lineages  would  be  impossible  to  establish;  this  ancestral 
population has been referred to, for instance, as a “communal ancestor” (Woese 1998), 
or as a “mutiphenotypical population of pre-cells” (Kandler 1994).
Fig. 1 Augier’s “arbre botanique” (Augier 1801; see Stevens 1983).
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Independently of the ‘single-cell’ versus ‘population’ controversy, the ancestral state, 
when taken as the last point in time when the three different domains of life were only 
one,  remains  commonly  understood  as  the  locus  of  organisms  that  bear  strong 
functional resemblance to the simplest life forms of each of these three domains. As a 
consequence  such  ancestral  organisms  are  already  fairly  complex  entities.  This 
complexity can be inferred from ‘minimal genome’ studies. In a given environment, a 
minimal genome would be a repertoire of genes that would be necessary and sufficient 
to support cellular life. It  was found in the 1990s that the number of truly essential 
genes of any organism might be quite small  compared to its complete genome. For 
instance,  some gene knock-out experiments have shown that the bacterium  Bacillus  
subtilis might still do well with only ~300 genes left out of its original pool of ~4100 
genes  (Itaya  1995).  Cross-species  comparison  of  genomes  via  computational 
comparative genomics indicate that certain genes tend to be quite closely related across 
species. For instance, the comparison of the genomes of  Haemophilus influenzae  and 
Mycoplasma genitalium shows that a couple hundred genes, called orthologous genes, 
had sequences that were more similar to each other than they were to other sequences 
from the two genomes (Mushegian and Koonin 1996). It was found that only ~15 genes 
had to be added to this set of orthologous genes in order to cover the full spectrum of 
essential cellular functions, including translation, transcription, replication, membrane 
transport, and energy conversion. In total therefore, a minimal genome might consist of 
only ~200-300 genes (Mushegian and Koonin 1996). 
Other studies based on phyletic patterns of orthologous gene sets, on phylogenetic 
species trees, and phylogenetic gene trees, show that essential genes tend to be highly 
evolutionarily conserved, both in terms of sequence evolution and in terms of wide 
phyletic spread (Jordan et al. 2002). Of course, such results might strongly be affected 
by gene loss and horizontal gene transfer (Gogarten et al.  2002), and it is not at all 
certain that an ancestral genetic signal might still persist within the genomes of extant 
organisms. Nevertheless, there appears to be a rather strong confidence that organisms 
of the ancestral state possessed already several hundreds of genes, potentially even ~600 
genes  (Koonin 2003).  For  some,  these genes  would be made out  of DNA (Forterre 
2002; Dworkin et al. 2003); others favor a mixed RNA-DNA genome and replication 
system (Leipe et al. 1999). 
In any case, the conclusion that can be drawn is that these organisms were already 
rather  complex biochemical  systems whose  spontaneous appearance  from inanimate 
matter appears quite unlikely (Moreira and Lopez-Garcia 2006). First, they would be 
endowed with a modern genetic polymer, DNA or RNA, whose prebiotic synthesis is far 
from obvious;  they  would  also  possess  several  hundred  genes  whose  simultaneous 
random abiotic synthesis is questionable. Second, this genetic system would be capable 
of replication, hence the presence of a replication machinery, potentially coupled to a 
repair system that would ensure a high fidelity persistence of the genome. Third, these 
organisms would possess a translation machinery that would carry out the synthesis of 
proteins in a comparable fashion to that of modern organisms in the sense that it would 
be based on the activity of some sort of ribosome. Fourth, they would be characterized 
by a metabolic activity that would very likely produce energy in the form of ATP by 
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generating a proton gradient across the cell. Finally, they would also be encapsulated 
within a membrane that would be capable of growth and division. 
The  simultaneous  presence  of  all  these  properties  and  chemical  subsystems 
make it unlikely for such ancestral organisms to have appeared spontaneously on the 
primitive Earth. Rather, they must have been preceded by simpler biochemical systems 
endowed with fewer and/or less sophisticated functionalities. I propose to refer to such 
simpler and more primitive entities as ‘protoliving systems’ (as in Fox 1991).  Such 
protoliving systems would be minimal living systems in the sense that they would be 
physico-chemical systems endowed with a self-sustaining metabolism and capable of 
evolution.  Compared  to  the  ancestral  organisms,  they  would  be  based  on  simpler 
molecular components, potentially the simplest components one could devise to make 
the  systems  function  in  a  life-like  manner.  These  protoliving  systems  might,  for 
instance,  possess  simpler  and  more  prebiotically  compatible  genetic  polymers  than 
DNA  or  even  RNA,  and  rely  on  peptide  nucleic  acids  (PNA)  or  others  (e.g. 
Eschenmoser 2007). They might also use simpler catalysts than proteins even if much 
less efficient, for instance oligopeptides and minerals (e.g. Rode 1999, Commeyras et 
al. 2004). They might also have a much simpler and rudimentary lipidic membrane that 
would  split  without  any molecular  regulatory system but  simply thanks to  physical 
pinching forces (e.g. Monnard and Deamer 2002), or even no lipid-based membrane at 
all  but  mineral  compartments  in  a  hydrothermal  chimney  (e.g.  Martin  and  Russell 
2003). Whatever these protoliving systems have actually been, my point is that other 
living  systems  must  have  preceded  the  ancestral  organisms  that  are  referred  to  as 
“LUCA” or as the “communal ancestor”, respectively in the single-cell and population 
hypotheses. In other words, the tree of life goes deeper than the stage that is most of the 
time referred to as its roots, and protoliving systems represent such an earlier stage. 
Now,  if  protoliving  systems  are  taken  to  be  ‘minimal’ living  systems  given  the 
environment  of  the  primitive  Earth,  it  then  seems  that  anything  simpler  would  not 
qualify as alive or, maybe more exactly, as ‘truly alive’. As a consequence, the deeper 
shape of the tree of life at its roots very much hinges on the question of defining life. If 
life is a yes/no property of any given biochemical system, and if protoliving systems are 
the simplest of such systems, then the tree of life starts with protoliving systems and 
does not go deeper. If, on the other hand, life is not such a clear-cut property but appears 
gradually through many biochemical cumulative stages, then the tree of life has roots 
that go deeper than protoliving systems and reach into non-living matter.
3 When defining life matters for the tree of life
The question of defining life has been, and still is, a matter of great controversy that has 
spurted numerous proposals and counter-proposals. Already in the 1970s and according 
to Carl Sagan himself, there was no broadly accepted definition of life: rather, it seemed 
that each biological discipline had a particular tendency to define life in its own terms, 
hence a plurality of definitions of life, be they anchored to physiological, metabolic, 
biochemical, genetic or thermodynamic preferences (Sagan 1970, 985). More recently, 
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several dozens of definitions of life have been referenced (see for instance Palyi et al. 
2002: 15-56; Popa 2004: 197-205). I would argue that these definitions tend to fall into 
two broad categories: on the one hand, ‘list-based definitions’, and on the other, ‘model-
based definitions’. In list-based definitions, living systems are defined with a list  of 
necessary and sufficient  properties  that  typically include  growth,  reproduction,  self-
repair, energy-harnessing capability,  matter-harnessing capability,  variation capability, 
information capability and so forth (see for instance Oparin 1961; Bernal 1967; Monod 
1970; Crick 1981; Mayr 1982; de Duve 1991; Farmer and Belin 1992; Koshland 2002; 
Morange  2003).  Any  physico-chemical  system  is  said  to  be  alive,  as  per  a  given 
definition, only if it possesses all the properties mentioned in this definition. Model-
based definitions, on the other hand, define living systems not on the basis of a list of 
necessary and sufficient properties, but on the basis of a model that describes the very 
functioning of such living systems (see for instance Maturana and Varela 1973; Gánti 
[1971] 2003; Ruiz-Mirazo et al.  2004). For instance, Gánti’s model consists in three 
functionally dependent cross-catalytic  subsystems – a metabolic network, a template 
information system, and a membrane that encloses everything – whose correct coupling 
ensures the growth and subsequent replication of the chemoton. In the case of such 
model-based  definitions,  a  physico-chemical  system  is  said  to  be  alive  only  if  its 
functioning can be represented by a model that is similar to the model proposed in the 
definition, or that includes such a model. 
Despite the many attempts to define life, be they ‘list-based’ or ‘model-based’, there 
still appears to be much disagreement on any of them: counter-examples are put forward 
that either might fulfill the definition conditions despite not being intuitively alive, or 
might be excluded by the definition contrary to our intuitions. For instance, some argue 
that viruses should not be included within the circle of living systems in so far as they 
lack metabolic  activity (e.g.  Luisi  1998;  Ruiz-Mirazo et  al.  2004);  others  argue the 
contrary, all the more now that it has been discovered that viruses form ‘viral factories’ 
that seem to possess the required properties of some of the list-based definitions of life 
(e.g. Raoult and Forterre 2008). Some also argue that self-replicating strands of RNA, 
like those that might have played a crucial  role in the ‘RNA world’ scenario of the 
origin of life (e.g. Gilbert 1986), might count as being alive since they are capable of 
replication and variation (e.g. Luisi 1998); for others on the contrary, such RNA strands 
lack metabolic activity and membrane enclosure, and therefore cannot count as living 
systems (e.g. Shapiro 1986; Segré et al. 2001). Some might argue that oligo-peptidic 
autocatalytic networks might rightly qualify as being alive (e.g. Kauffman 1993); others 
would reject this claim on the grounds that such autocatalytic networks might not be 
capable of evolution (e.g. Luisi 1998; Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004). In a similar fashion, one 
could  question  whether  minimal  protoliving  systems as  those  proposed by Szostak, 
Bartel and Luisi (2001) or Libchaber and his team (Noireaux et al. 2005), might more 
properly qualify as alive than, for instance, those pursued by Rasmussen and colleagues 
(Rasmussen et al. 2003). And so forth.
What this debates clearly illustrates is that there are indeed a fairly wide range of 
properties and models that can be called upon to delineate living systems from non-
living ones in many different ways. Incidentally, this also shows that there seems to be a 
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‘gray-zone’ in between what one would intuitively qualify as living and what one would 
definitely count as non-living. This gray zone might also very well encompass the range 
of physico-chemical systems that are likely to have represented key milestones along 
the  transition  from non-living  to  living  matter.  Indeed,  a  much  favored  hypothesis 
among scientists about the origin of life is that of a very gradual process, involving the 
appearance, fine-tuning and coupling of several properties, and spanning over millions 
of years (e.g. de Duve 1991; Popa 2004). As a consequence, there would not be any 
sharp delineation between non-living and living matter: ‘life’ would be the outcome of a 
succession of ‘more-or-less  alive’ systems.  Stated differently,  the property of ‘being 
alive’ or of ‘belonging to the class of living systems’ would be better  captured as a 
matter of degrees rather than as a matter of a dichotomous ‘yes/no’ delineation. This has 
led some to argue that a framework based on classical logic and its law of bivalence is 
not appropriate to define life, and ought to be replaced by a framework resting on fuzzy- 
or multi-valued logic (see Bruylants et al. in press). In such a case, a zero-to-one scale 
would be defined by attributing a zero-value to a set of physico-chemical systems that 
would definitely count as non-living, for instance simple chemical compounds of the 
primitive  Earth  such  as  methane,  ammonia  or  carbon  dioxide,  and  a  one-value  to 
systems that would definitely qualify as living, for instance protoliving systems of the 
type mentioned earlier. Within such a scale then, any physico-chemical system might 
receive a score between zero and one that would represent its ‘lifeness’ or degree of 
being alive: it would be more alive than a molecule of methane, yet less alive than a 
protoliving system. 
Such an approach not only makes it possible to reconcile differing viewpoints about 
dichotomous definitions of life and border-line cases, but also takes into account some 
of the latest scientific knowledge about the origin of life and the very likelihood of a 
gradual and multi-step transition from non-living to living matter.  Viewing life  as a 
matter  of  degrees  entails  a  tree  of  life  that  would  have  roots  going  deeper  than 
protoliving systems (value of one on the scale of lifeness) and somehow dissolving into 
non-living matter (value of zero). These roots would represent biochemical systems that 
would be more alive than simple chemical compounds yet less alive than protoliving 
systems, and that would also be historical ancestors to these protoliving systems. These 
roots, however, do not form a solid line, but rather fade away as they move from fully 
living systems down to non-living matter.
4 ‘Lifeness signatures’
If physico-chemical systems may receive a score of lifeness between zero and one, and 
as a result qualify as ‘more or less’ alive, one may ask on which grounds such a score 
might  be  attributed.  An  answer  might  be  that  the  lifeness  score  should  be  a  good 
measure of how far such a system is from non-living matter (score zero) and how close 
it  is  to  living  matter  (score  one).  Since  score  one  has  been  defined  as  that  of  a 
protoliving system, a minimal system endowed with a self-sustaining metabolism and 
capable of evolution, any system with a score of less than one would not be able to 
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display this full set of properties. But it would seem that there could be several ways to 
do so: a system might be capable of metabolic activity without being able to reproduce 
itself, hence to evolve by natural selection; another one might be able to self-replicate 
without any metabolic activity; yet another one might be capable of metabolism and of 
reproduction, yet not of variation, hence not of Darwinian evolution; and so forth. The 
degree of lifeness of any system can therefore be interpreted as a weighted average of 
the degrees of performance of this given system along a set of functional dimensions, 
including  for  instance:  replication,  variation,  metabolism,  individuation  etc2.  And 
indeed, any given system might be more-or-less successful at making copies of itself, 
more-or-less  successful  at  generating  variants  of  itself,  more-or-less  successful  at 
metabolizing components or energy tokens from given sets of available nutrients and 
energy  sources,  more-or-less  successful  at  individuating  itself  with  a  sophisticated 
membrane, or even more-or-less successful at co-organizing or coupling any two of the 
above properties. 
Each  degree  of  performance  along  any  of  these  functional  dimensions  can  also 
receive  a  more  precise  definition.  For  instance,  individuation  might  be  realized  in 
different ways and with different performance scores. Starting simple, it appears very 
likely that membranes evolved much in complexity over time. As illustration, one can 
tentatively propose, at least, five different stages of individuation performance. Stage I 
might  correspond  to  enclosure  within  mineral  compartments,  for  instance  within 
growing hydrothermal chimneys with circulating flows of sulphide-rich hydrothermal 
fluid  and  iron-containing  water  (e.g.  Martin  and  Russell  2003);  such  compartments 
would have provided individuation means, yet would be fixed, with little possibility of 
molecular exchange with the environment. Stage II might correspond to rudimentary bi-
layer  vesicles  that  are  likely  to  have  resulted  from  the  self-assembly  of  simple 
amphiphile  molecules  (e.g.  fatty  acids)  following  their  abiotic  synthesis  and  their 
concentration in pools or droplets of water; such vesicles might have indeed been the 
first  types  of  membranes  encountered  on the  primitive  Earth;  yet  they remain  very 
fragile,  sensitive  to  concentration,  temperature  and  pH  (e.g.  Monnard  and  Deamer 
2002).  In  stage  III,  the  addition  of  other  molecules  such  as  sterols  or  amphiphilic 
polypeptides could have resulted in slightly more robust vesicles that would be stable 
across  a  broader  set  of  chemical  conditions,  and that  would  be  larger  as  well  (e.g. 
Rohmer et al. 1979; Luisi 2002). Stage IV might then correspond to the insertion of 
specialized transporters and active catalysts; these new compounds might have enabled 
vesicles to create and maintain chemical disequilibria with their environment, thereby 
opening up more sustainable metabolic activities (e.g. Ourisson and Nakatami 1994). In 
stage V, the subsequent additions of other more complex organic compounds such as 
polysaccharides, energy-transduction components or surface-layers components would 
have  resulted  in  the  appearance  of  the  extremely sophisticated  and multi-functional 
membranes like those of current organisms. 
Similarly,  one  might  conceive  of  ways  of  defining  stages  for  each  one  of  the 
remaining functional dimensions mentioned above (replication, variation, metabolism 
2 Such dimensions might correspond to properties of “list-based” definitions or relate to the functioning 
characteristics of the models involved in “model-based” definitions of life. 
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and coupling), or for any other one that might be found relevant. One would then end up 
with  a  compound number  of  functional  scales  along which  the  performance of  any 
given physico-chemical system might be evaluated. And, in order to fit the zero-to-one 
overall scale of lifeness, all stages of all functional dimensions would be renormalized 
to a zero-to-one scale. For any given system, the weighted average of all the scores 
along the functional dimensions would then result in its overall lifeness score. 
Yet, and most importantly, the pattern of functional scores that each system would 
get  along  the  different  functional  dimensions  would  then  represent  its  particular 
‘lifeness signature’. Such a lifeness signature makes it possible to understand where any 
given system lays on the multi-dimensional pathways leading from non-living to living 
matter. For instance, a system might be good at replicating itself, yet might do poorly in 
the other functional dimensions (example: an autocatalyst). Another system might do 
well in terms of individuating and replicating itself, yet poorly elsewhere (example: a 
lipid vesicle). Yet another might have an excellent metabolic activity while scoring low 
in terms of  variation or individuation (example:  an autocatalytic  set).  And so forth. 
Overall,  ‘lifeness  signatures’ might  lead  us  to  identify  types  of  systems  that  may 
represent key evolutionary milestones from non-living to living matter (see Fig. 2). Let 
us note, however, that such milestones need not be arranged in a successive cumulative 
manner, but might end up showing parallel pathways towards a minimal fully functional 
and alive protoliving system. 
Fig.  2 Lifeness signatures for systems in between non-living and living matter.  The 
‘lifeness  signature’  of  a  given  system  is  represented  by  a  polygon  joining  the 
performance scores of this system along each one of the relevant functional dimensions. 
In the cases depicted here, ‘i’ represents individuation, ‘r’ replication, ‘v’ variation, ‘m’ 
metabolism and  ‘c’ coupling.  Each  scale  goes  from the  center  (value  zero)  to  the 
periphery (value one). 
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Such a multidimensional way of representing border-line systems in between inanimate 
matter and life helps reconcile differing viewpoints about the lifeness of some of the 
most controversial systems. Indeed, each of the controversial examples might very well 
represent  particular  types  of  such  ‘more-or-less  alive  systems’,  each  with  its  own 
particular lifeness signature. For instance, auto-catalytic RNAs might be accounted for 
by a lifeness signature that would be strong on replication, average on variation, poor on 
individuation, metabolism and coupling. On the other hand, oligo-peptidic autocatalytic 
networks  might  have  a  lifeness  signature  that  would  be  strong  on  replication  and 
metabolism, yet weak everywhere else. In other words, the multidimensional scale make 
it possible to reconcile different definitions of life by equating them to different ‘lifeness 
signatures’.  Also,  qualifying  particular  physico-chemical  systems  via  the 
multidimensional scale of their ‘lifeness signature’ shifts the focus away from trying to 
find  the  ‘ideal’  clear-cut  dichotomous  delineation  of  living  systems:  rather,  this 
highlights the importance of identifying particular types of ‘more-or-less alive systems’ 
and of providing means of understanding their key features and their inter-relatedness. 
A consequence of this view is that, at its very bottom, going back in time, the tree of 
life not only dissolves gradually into non-living matter, but does so in a plurality of 
ways, following the evolutionary pathways of the most successful ‘lifeness signatures’. 
In other words, the tree of life would not have a single root that would start below the 
level of the ancestral organisms and below the level of protoliving systems, but a system 
of several intertwined roots (see Fig. 3): some of them might correspond to systems that 
might have been good replicators but with a poor metabolism; others to systems with a 
good metabolic activity yet little success in generating variants; and so forth. One might 
imagine  ways  for  systems  to  partly  evolve  along  one  or  several  of  the  functional 
dimensions that correspond to their lifeness signature. One can also imagine ways for 
such  systems  to  develop  new  functionalities  or  gain  them by  lateral  transfer  from 
entities  with  a  different  signature,  thereby pursuing a  slightly different  evolutionary 
path.  In any case,  the existence of multiple types  of ‘more-or-less alive systems’ to 
which would correspond different  ‘lifeness  signatures’ would entail  a  rather  ‘bushy’ 
system of multiple roots that gradually fade away into non-living matter as one tracks 
the multiple origins of life backward in time.
5 Three more points
Identifying real-case examples of ‘lifeness signatures’
One of the key scientific challenges associated with this multidimensional view of the 
transition from non-living to living matter is to pin down actual examples of different 
lifeness signatures that would also be prebiotically relevant. Unlike in some of its upper 
branches, populating the tree of the life at its base remains highly speculative: the fossil 
record is scarce and spurs lasting controversies when it comes to interpreting minute 
structures or molecular compounds that might, or not, be remains of primitive forms of 
life (e.g. Schopf 2006; Brasier et al 2006). It is even possible that no fossil older than 
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3.7 billion years will ever be found. As a result, the best one might likely be required to 
settle for is possible scenarios populated by experimentally reconstructed entities that 
are compatible with the environmental conditions supposed to be those of the primitive 
Earth (e.g. Kasting 2005), and that are built from chemical compounds that are also 
shown to be prebiotically relevant. 
There have already been several experiments showcasing specific chemical-systems 
that display, to a certain extent, some of the functional dimensions I mentioned above. 
Unfortunately, such systems are limited and often remain far from appearing compatible 
with  the  abiotic  conditions  of  the  primitive  Earth:  in  particular,  they  may  rely  on 
sophisticated  chemical  compounds  whose  prebiotic  synthesis  is  unknown or  judged 
unlikely, or they may unfold in very particular chemical conditions that might appear 
unlikely  to  be  found  in  the  natural  world.  Such  systems  include  sets  of  chemical 
compounds that can cross-catalyze each others’ synthesis, and that can therefore display 
properties of replication and quantitative growth; examples include autocatalytic sets of 
nucleic acids (Yjivikua et al. 1990), of RNA strands (Sievers and Von Kiedrowski 1994; 
Kim and Joyce 2004), or of polypeptides (Lee et al. 1996; Yao et al. 1998; Ashkenasy et 
al.  2004). Other systems may include sets of chemical compounds that can spatially 
self-organize  into  physically  bound  systems  like  micelles  or  vesicles,  and  that  can 
therefore exhibit some form of individuation property. This is the case of certain organic 
compounds found in meteorites (Deamer 1985), of some amphiphile molecules that can 
self-organize  into  autocatalytic  self-replicating  micelles  (Bachman  et  al.  1992),  and 
more generally of a broad range of lipids,  be they phospholipids or fatty acids,  for 
which some prebiotic chemical pathways might have been proposed (e.g. Hargreaves et 
al. 1977; Nooner and Oro 1979) and that can display surprising properties of growth, 
budding, fission or fusion (Hanczyc and Szostak 2004), of surface catalysis (Rajamani 
et al. 2008), in addition to being good cases of individuation and of selective molecular 
exchange with the environment (Sacerdote and Szostak 2005). 
Nevertheless, the multidimensional root system I have tentatively proposed, remains, 
in large parts, to be populated with prebiotically compatible systems. This is crucial if 
one  is  to  identify the  key milestones  on  the  way to  the  appearance  of  fully-living 
systems on Earth. Yet, I would argue that, by being continuously revisited and adapted 
to  fit  the  facts,  such a  tentative  map has  great  value  and can  serve  as  a  means  of 
highlighting the different functional dimensions that matter on the way to life, and of 
identifying  the  inter-relatedness  of  systems  that  are  more  than  non-living  yet  still 
somehow less than alive. 
‘Lifeness signatures’: compatibility with other hypotheses on the roots of tree of life
In this contribution, my major claims with regards to the tree of life are that (1) the tree 
ought to be represented as going deeper than the ‘ancestral organism level’ where most 
trees tend to stop, and as having a ‘protoliving system level’ that would correspond to a 
much simpler,  and minimal,  form of  living  systems endowed with a  self-sustaining 
metabolism and  capable  of  evolution  by natural  selection,  (2)  the  tree  ought  to  be 
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represented as going even deeper than protoliving systems with a system of several 
distinct  yet  intertwined roots that  gradually fade away into non-living matter  as the 
physico-chemical systems that are on these roots perform less and less well along the 
functional  dimensions  that  characterize their  particular  lifeness signature.  These two 
claims are compatible with different other claims about the roots of the tree of life, and 
upon which I wished to remain neutral. They are, for instance, compatible with different 
scenarios  at  the  level  of  the  ancestral  organism,  be  they population-  or  single-cell-
oriented,  and  also  with  scenarios  that  would  include  ancestral  organisms  without 
descent.  They are also compatible  with multiple  scenarios at  the protoliving system 
level:  single-protoliving  system  scenarios,  population-based  scenarios,  as  well  as 
scenarios that would branch out very early without long-term descent. And finally, my 
two claims are also compatible with different scenarios that would propose multiple 
origins of life.  
Laterally expanding the tree
I  have  argued  that  the  transition  from non-living  to  living  matter  would  be  better 
represented by a multidimensional map that would capture key lifeness signatures and 
their inter-relatedness, and that would do so to account for the historically bound event 
which  is  the  appearance  of  life  on  Earth  some 3.8  billion  years  (e.g.  Despois  and 
Gargaud 2006).  Yet,  a related argument  could be formulated that would have direct 
consequences  on  our  way of   delineating  current living  organisms from non-living 
matter. Similarly to the historical gradation and multidimensionality of ‘more-or-less 
alive systems’ on their way to life, one could picture the delineation of current forms of 
life as a gray zone that might be populated by ‘less-than-living’ yet ‘more than non-
living’ physico-chemical systems. Such systems might have no relevance at all when it 
comes to explaining the origins of life, yet might indeed exist today, play a crucial roles 
in the biomass, and display particular lifeness signatures. 
For instance, one could argue that entities such as viruses might belong to this gray 
zone: they are capable of individuation and of coupling the reproduction of their most 
visible entities, virions, to the metabolic and replication processes of their cellular hosts, 
and they might well represent also one of the most abundant biological entities on Earth 
(e.g.  Edwards  and  Rohwer  2005).  Viruses  that  infect  other  viruses  might  also  be 
included (La Scola et al. 2008). The list of such border-line biochemical systems might 
also include those infectious proteinic molecules called prions, as well as self-standing 
genetic  material  such  as  plasmids  or,  more  generally  speaking,  entities  part  of  the 
“communal gene pool” that surround other living systems (Norman et al. 2009). And 
this list is, for sure, open. In a sense therefore, not only would there be no clear-cut 
historical transition between non-living and living matter, but there would also be no 
clear-cut delineation between current non-living and living systems. Such a view would 
result in laterally expanding the tree of life by adding a shaded zone of ‘more-or-less 
alive’ systems to some of its existing solid branches (see Fig. 3). It would make, not 
only, its roots fuzzy, but even some of its most current branches.
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Fig.  3 The roots of the tree of  life.  Whereas most  trees of  life tend to start  at the level  of the  
‘ancestral organisms’, two deeper stages have been added: the stage of the protoliving systems and 
the stage  of  the borderline  more-or-less  alive systems whose lifeness signatures determine their 
positioning on specific early roots of the tree of life that gradually emerge from non-living matter. 
The lateral shading of the tree would correspond to ‘more-or-less alive systems’ concomitant with  
fully living ones.
6 Conclusion
Trees of life do not start with a solid trunk or system of trunks: they have roots, or so 
have  I  argued.  My claims  are  that  such  roots  expand  well  below  the  level  of  the 
‘ancestral organisms’ where most trees tend to start, and which can refer to single-cell 
hypotheses  as  in  the  case  of  LUCA or  to  population  hypotheses.  I  have  made two 
claims. The first one is that, below ‘ancestral organisms’, the roots of the tree of life go 
down to a level of ‘protoliving systems’ that are much simpler living entities than the 
‘ancestral organisms’ are usually portrayed to be, and that are also defined as minimally 
living in the fuller sense. My second claim is that below ‘protoliving systems’, the roots 
of the tree of life form a multidimensional system of roots that progressively dissolve 
into non-living matter, thereby corresponding to a gradual or multi-stage transition from 
non-living to living matter along several functional dimensions. In this system of fading 
roots, I have proposed that physico-chemical systems be characterized by their ‘lifeness 
signature’, that is to say their degree of performance along a set of relevant functional 
dimensions. Not only might such a ‘lifeness signature’ alter the way we think about the 
roots of the tree of life, it might also change the way we generally delineate life from 
non-life.
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